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A bank’s crisis: the case of Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
Abstract 
The case retraces the main attributes that characterised the crisis of the Italian bank Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena. Among these, a key role was played by the peculiar governance structure of 
the institution, as well as the elevated amount of non-performing loans that it presented on 
balance sheet. 
After more than 10 years of dissipation of resources and poor results, the Italian government 
operated a precautionary recapitalization to bail-out the bank in 2017. 
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Monte dei Paschi di Siena: the oldest bank in the world 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) is the oldest bank of the world. Although it has been one of 
the largest Italian institutions for several years, a recent series of scandals and hazardous 
management decisions have led the Italian government to bail it out in 2017. 
MPS’ centuries-old history traces back to 1472, when the Magistracies of the Republic of Siena 
ordered the foundation of “Monte Pio” pawn agency. The organization had the ultimate 
objective of giving aid to the most needful social classes of Siena. 
With the beginning of the 17th century, due to the increasing impelling needs of the citizens of 
Siena, a new mount of piety, the “Monte non valicabile dei Paschi della città e stato di Siena” 
was created. In 1783, after more than 100 years of close operation, the two mounts merged into 
a single institution called Monti Riuniti (“combined mounts”). 
Almost one century later, at the time of the unification of Italy, Monti Riuniti was the largest 
and most solid bank of the country. In 1872, thanks to the approval of a new charter, the bank 
was given its current name. The statute also specified that “Monte dei Paschi is an institution 
of the city of Siena to whom it owes its origin, therefore the Municipality of Siena maintains 
supervision, direction and safeguard [of the bank] and manages [it] by means of an elective 
board”. Moreover, the new charter established that half of the bank’s net income would be 
devoted to projects of aid and public utility for the city of Siena. Through the statute, the 
embedded relationship existing between the bank and the local community had been recognized 
at a political level. 
In 1936, a deep transformation of the Italian banking system was operated by the fascist 
government. The 1936 Banking Law was based on the principle of separation between banks 
and companies, establishing that banks were forbidden to hold participations in private 
enterprises. In particular, MPS’ was declared a public-law credit institution under the 
jurisdiction of the Italian government. Despite of the remonstrance of the Municipality of Siena, 
a new statute was approved with an official decree of the head of Government. Above all, the 
decree established that the President and three members of the Deputation of the bank would 
now be appointed by the Italian government, rather than the Municipality of Siena, which would 
still nominate 4 out of the 8 members of the management board. This specification, while 
maintaining a strong political influence within the bank’s governance, unfastened MPS’ 
dependence on the city of Siena and its local politics. 
After the WWII, MPS carried out a series of acquisitions of smaller institutes that led it to be a 





While the bank pursued its development objectives, a disruptive change was about to take place 
in terms of banking regulation. In fact, in 1990, Law n. 218 30/07/1990 (so-called “Amato law”) 
abrogated the 1936 Banking Law. In particular, the public-law credit institutions defined in 
1936 were now allowed to split themselves into two entities: on one hand an enterprise that 
performed the banking activity and, on the other hand, a foundation (so-called “banking 
foundation”) to whom was allocated the activity of general aid in several fields. In this splitting 
procedure, the banking foundation had the role of entirely subscribing the capital for the 
creation of the bank; moreover, the law stated that the foundations must maintain the majority 
of their equity stakes.  
Due to the mentioned regulation, the formal privatization of MPS occurred in 1995, when the 
bank was split into two organizations: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. and Fondazione 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS foundation). While the former performs the bank activities of 
credit, finance, and insurance, the latter pursues the aims of charity, aid and social benefit within 
the province of Siena. This partition process had the odd effect of reinforcing the political 
influence that had shaped MPS’ activity until then. In fact, by looking at the charter of the MPS 
Foundation, it seems clear that the relationship between Siena’s political parties and MPS had 
been brought back to how it used to be before 1936. The statute established that the 16 members 
of the Deputation (the foundation’s administrative body) were appointed as follows: 
• 8 members by the Municipality of Siena 
• 5 by the Province of Siena 
• 1 by the University of Siena 
• 1 by the Tuscany Region 
• 1 by Archdioceses of Siena, Colle Val d’Elsa and Montalcino 
The foundation was, in turn, responsible for appointing the board of MPS, since it was the main 
shareholder of the bank. As it may be grasped, the privatization had only taken place on a formal 
level; on the practical one, it was still Siena’s local administration that indirectly managed the 
MPS’ businesses.  
The tight chain built by Siena’s political system could not be broken even by the law n. 461 
23/12/1998 (so-called “Ciampi law”), aimed at harmonizing and integrating the limited 
regulation regarding the banking foundations. In particular, on one hand, it ultimately qualified 
the foundations as private-law institutions, with full statutory and managerial autonomy. On the 
other hand, contrary to the Amato law, the rule stated the obligation for the foundations to give 





foundation retained control over the Monte dei Paschi, drawing upon legal tricks that allowed 
it to comply with the Ciampi law while maintaining the actual control over Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena; later on, the Foundation would even run into debt in order to keep its position of 
strength into MPS.  
The described mechanism gave rise to the so-called “Siena system”: a complex network of 
interests and tied participations that, especially in its early stages, created wealth and growth in 
the whole Municipality of Siena, mainly thanks to the re-investment of the MPS’ (often) 
distributed earnings. The “system” deliberately outlined the strategies for the bank; more 
specifically, the pattern chosen was the one of the inorganic growth. In relation to this, MPS 
acquired Banca Agricola del Salento in 1998. 
One year later, on June 25th 1999, Monte dei Paschi di Siena was listed on the Italian stock 
exchange, registering requests for stock purchases of more than 10 times the offering1. The 
successful operation was welcomed by the whole Siena community and its political parties, 
especially considering the MPS foundation was able to retain 60% of the MPS equity, 
maintaining controlling interests in the bank. 
In 2000, MPS acquired Banca del Salento (better known as Banca 121), on the basis of the 
defined strategy of inorganic growth. The institution was regarded as “the bank of the future”2  
and MPS acquired it for 2500 billions of Italian lira (around €1,29 bn); the price was regarded 
as very high at the time3, considering that equity value of Banca 121 was in the order of 800 
billions of lira (€413 mln). Besides the monetary price, MPS paid around 1000 billions of lira 
(more than €500 mln) in the years following the acquisition, as a compensation for the 
customers object of misselling by Banca 121; the bank had been responsible for the sale of 
innovative, risky financial contracts (namely the so-called “MyWay” and “4You”) to 
customers unaware of their exposure.  All in all, the acquisition was regarded as a fiasco by 
the public opinion, that drew a connection between its failure and the political influences 
pressuring MPS. 
The election of Giuseppe Mussari as president of the foundation first (2001), and of MPS later 
(2006), radicalized the control of Siena’s political parties over the bank; indeed, Mussari was a 
                                                      
1 Signoretti, Fabio Massimo. 1999. “Mps, Collocamento Record Titoli Assegnati a Sorteggio.” Repubblica, June 
19, 1999. 
2 Banca 121 had been the first “multi-channel” bank of the country, specializing in the online banking services. 
See Gatti, Claudio. 2006. “Mps e Quell’acquisto Costoso Nel Salento.” Il Sole 24 Ore, September 27, 2006. 





young lawyer widely known4 to be supportive of the governing party “Democratici di Sinistra” 
(DS). 
Few years later, in 2003, a legal “trick” allowed the institution to realize the duty previously 
imposed by the Ciampi law. Through the conversion of a group of ordinary stocks into preferred 
shares, the MPS foundation fell below the level of 51% of the bank’s equity, going from 58,6% 
to 49%5. However, the preferred shares still granted MPS the majority of the votes in the 
extraordinary general meetings, and the level of 49% was more than enough to control the bank 
on a de facto basis. Control that led, at least partially, to the fatal acquisition of Banca 
Antonveneta in 2008. 
The last step of the inorganic growth: Antonveneta acquisition 
On November 8th 2007 Monte dei Paschi di Siena announced that it had reached an agreement 
with Banco Santander for the acquisition of the Italian institute Banca Antoveneta. MPS won 
the deal against the competition of BNP Paribas, after having received an ultimatum of the 
president of Santander, who threatened the Italian bank to open a competitive bid if it would 
not raise its offer. 
In the wave of a large process of banks mergers6, the deal was perceived as the last opportunity 
to adapt MPS’ structure to the increasingly competitive international markets; in relation to this, 
strong pressures in favour of a large acquisition were coming from both Rome’s government 
and Siena’s local entities7. Through the investment, MPS became the third bank for 
capitalization in Italy, with a market share of 10%, adding 1000 branches to already existing 
2000. However, the acquisition would be one of the most debated in the history of Italy, mainly 
because of the price paid and other related issues. 
At the date of the announcement, the declared price was €9.3 bn, 6 of which later reported as 
goodwill; considering the financial expenses, the actual purchase price ultimately rose to around 
€10.3 bn8. MPS paid Antonveneta at multiple “P/Branch” of 8,9 in line with the Italian average; 
the P/E of 26,2 appeared to be fairly above the mean value of 23,39. However, the oddest figure 
                                                      
4 Peruzzi, Cesare. 2016. “Monte Paschi Da Ferdinando II Ad Oggi: Parabola Della Banca Più Antica Del 
Mondo.” Il Sole 24 ORE, December 27, 2016. 
5 Signoretti, Fabio Massimo. 2003. “Mps, La Fondazione Sotto Il 50%.” Repubblica, May 16, 2003 
6 Above all the noteworthy merger between Banca Intesa and Sanpaolo Imi. 
7 “In Merito Alla Fondazione Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena e Alla Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena. I Rapporti 
Con La Regione Toscana.” 
8 Ibidem 






arises from the comparison between this acquisition and the purchase of Antonveneta by Banco 
Santander itself. In fact, Antonveneta had been acquired few months earlier by Santander from 
ABN Amro for €6.6 bn; through the sale to MPS, Santander ultimately realized a capital gain 
of more than €3 billion in just 3 months10 . 
In addition to the already expensive price, MPS had to settle a debt of €7.9 bn that Antonveneta 
presented on balance sheet towards Santander. It seems worthy to mention that the existence of 
this obligation was only assessed after the announcement of the deal; in fact, as reported by one 
of the prospectuses of the operation11, MPS had already closed the costly deal without 
performing any kind of due diligence, mainly because of the pressures coming from the selling-
side. This additional duty determined the payment of more than 17 billions of euro to Santander, 
that MPS delivered entirely by cash, through 8 checks12 between May 2008 and April 2009. 
Apart from the debit, the following weaknesses were ascertained only after the closing of the 
deal13: Antonveneta was poorly divisionalised, provisions for 2007 had to be re-assessed, costs 
were already relatively low and the bank presented problems in managing the external and 
internal communications. 
Because of the elevated capital requirements necessary for sustaining the acquisition, the Bank 
of Italy requested MPS to fulfil specific financing needs, in order to ensure the financial 
feasibility of the transaction. Therefore, the acquisition process only started on May 2008, after 
the approval of the financing plan elaborated by MPS. This consisted 4 legs14, as follows: 
1. A €5 bn recapitalization. Not to lose control, the MPS foundation subscribed pro-rata 
for €2,8 billion and ended up concentrating 75% of its capital in the bank. From that 
moment on, the foundation’s destiny would have been, unfortunately, strictly dependent 
on the performance of Monte dei Paschi. 
2. Issue of new shares for a total value of €950 mln. In particular, the shares were an 
innovative form of hybrid securities, denominated “FRESH”, (Floating Rate Equity-
linked Subordinated Hybrid Preferred Securities). The FRESH emission was subscribed 
by JP Morgan (JPM), which financed it through the issue of bonds convertible in MPS 
                                                      
10 Ibidem. 
11 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 2008. “Prospetto Informativo Relativo All’offerta in Opzione e 
All’ammissione a Quotazione Sul Mercato Telematico Azionario Organizzato e Gestito Da Borsa Italiana 
s.p.a. Di Azioni Ordinarie Di Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena s.p.A.” 
12 Conti, Camilla, and Luca Piana. 2012. “La Lista Segreta Del Monte.” L’Espresso, December 2012. 
13 Biasia, Chiara. 2013. “Le Operazioni Di M&A Nel Settore Bancario Italiano. Il Caso Banca MPS - 
Antonveneta.” 
14 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 2008. “Documento Informativo Relativo All’acquisizione Di Parte Di Banca 





shares (FRESH bonds). JPM retained only the usufruct of the shares, and it was 
established that MPS had to pay a coupon to JPM only in the case of dividend 
distribution; the coupon, in turn, represented the repayment for the FRESH bonds. 
Therefore, JPM was just an intermediary into this transaction, while the actual financers 
were the subscribers of the FRESH bonds. Among these, the MPS foundation had 
purchased €490 mln of bonds, even engaging into debt to finance the transaction15. 
3. Issue of 10-year subordinated bonds for a comprehensive amount of €2.16 bn. 
4. A bridge financing with a pool of banks (Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, JPMorgan, Citi, 
Mediobanca and  Goldman Sachs) for a total value of €1.56 bn, to be paid back through 
the sale of non-strategic assets.  
The derivatives scandal 
Apart from the costly Antonveneta acquisition, other happenings determined, later on, serious 
effects on the bank’s financial statements and reputation. In particular, the derivatives scandal 
comprises three complex contracts defined before the financial crisis of 2008. During that 
period, derivatives were extremely appealing because they could yield high returns with (just 
apparently16) low risk combinations; therefore, even commercial banks like MPS were 
approaching to these instruments. The scandal emerged after the finding of a document (so-
called “mandate agreement”) at the end of 2012, and led MPS to the restatement (in 2012) of 
some items of the 2011 financial statements, in accordance with IAS 8; this, in turn, determined 
a negative effect on the regulatory capital of the bank in the balance sheet of 2012 as well17. In 
chronological order, the most problematic MPS’ derivatives were Santorini, Alexandria and 
Nota Italia. 
Santorini was born in 2002, when MPS gave up its participation in Sanpaolo IMI to Deutsche 
Bank (DB), by selling Sanpaolo shares for a total value €785 mln. In particular, €329 mln of 
these were injected by MPS in the special-purpose vehicle (SPV) Santorini Investment Ltd, 
participated by Deutsche and MPS, respectively for 51% and 49%. Then, it was defined a 
collared equity swap between Santorini and Deustche, whose underlying were the Sanpaolo 
IMI shares at the last traded price of €11,74. According to this contract, Deutsche had to pay 
                                                      
15 Bernabei, Stefano. 2012. “Mps-Antonveneta, La Storia Del Fresh Nei Carteggi Con Bankitalia.” Reuters, May 
21, 2012. 
16 Ratings on derivatives were very high and did not reflect the actual risk of the contracts. 
17 The description of the derivatives is entirely based on the specifications made by Monte dei Paschi into its 





the shares’ dividends to Santorini and, at the contract maturity, the delta, if positive, between 
the market price of the stocks and their last traded price (€11,74), given a certain cap. On the 
other hand, Santorini was compelled to pay a fixed rate of 4,81% to Deutsche and, at maturity, 
the difference, if negative, between the market price and the last traded price of the shares, 
given a certain floor. 
In 2006 DB withdrew from Santorini, and MPS remained 100% owner of the SPV. Meanwhile, 
as the maturity of the equity swap was approaching, Sanpaolo IMI shares were trading even 
below the established floor, resulting in a potential loss of 362 million euros for Santorini 
(therefore for MPS) in 2008. This could not happen, since MPS was expected to pay out 
dividends, allowing the foundation to receive the coupon on the FRESH. The plot of interests 
led MPS to restructure Santorini with DB in December, 2008. First of all, Deutsche and 
Santorini agreed to a three-leg derivative contract on Italian BTPs18, that was soon closed out, 
determining a €364 mln capital gain that offset the potential loss. Secondly, MPS agreed to a 
total return swap on €2045 mln BTPs with Deutsche bank, that comprised the following mutual 
obligations: 
1. MPS sells BTPs to Deustche, receiving the market value at the effective date. 
2. At each BTP’s coupon payment, MPS receives the coupon from Deutsche and pays a 
floating rate. 
3. At maturity, Deutsche provides Monte de’ Paschi with an amount equal to the value 
actually received from the BTP’s face value repayment. 
To sum up, the overall operation cancelled out the effects of the original Santorini derivative 
(the equity swap), allowing the Italian bank not to report a loss in 2008. However, the loss 
would not, of course, disappear; it would be spread all over the duration of the new contract. 
On the accounting point of view, Monte dei Paschi did not derecognize the BTPs from its assets 
and recognized among its liabilities a long term repo (LTR) of the amount received (recognition 
at cost). Only in 2012, it was ascertained that the liability should have been recognized at the 
fair value, rather than at cost. The error was estimated in the amount of €429 mln gross tax, and 
led to the correction of the equity value as at 31/12/2011 for -327,8 million euros. 
Alexandria is probably the most discussed operation, since it gave rise to the whole scandal. 
The derivative arose at the end 2005, and it was arranged by the London branch of Dresdner 
Bank. In particular, MPS acquired bonds issued by the “first-level” vehicle Alexandria, at the 
face value of €400 mln. However, the amount raised through the emission of the notes was 
                                                      





invested by Alexandria in the securities issued by another SPV: Skylark. This company, in turn, 
used most of the collected liquidity for the purchase of a risky portfolio of US’ asset-backed 
securities and credit default swaps (CDS). By retracing the streamline of cash flows, it can be 
understood that the actual value of the financial instruments held by MPS was depending on 
the ABS and CDS owned by Skylark; technically, Alexandria is a CDO-Squared, one of the 
kind of instruments that determined the financial crisis of 2008. Moreover, what seems curious 
is that both Skylark and Alexandria were vehicles owned by Dresdner Bank; therefore, the bank 
had managed the whole operation in order to invest in risky securities, dropping the likely losses 
on Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 
And that is what happened indeed. During and after the financial crisis, the Alexandria notes 
lost 55% of their value, determining a negative amount to be reported by MPS on the 2009 
income statement of €220 mln. Taking this into account, as well as the need of the MPS’ 
foundation for a dividend pay-out in order to receive the FRESH coupons, MPS designed a deal 
with the Japanese bank Nomura to spread the loss over the future years; both the aim and the 
contractual structure of the agreement were similar to the restructuring of Santorini. First, 
Nomura substituted the original notes with others of higher quality; the substitution happened 
without causing any economic effect into MPS’ financial statements. Then, MPS would pay 
back Nomura through a long-term repo transaction (LTR) for €3050 mln of BTPs.  
MPS did not disclose the terms of this agreement neither to the authorities of the Bank of Italy 
and Consob nor to the audit advisors of KPMG; this led them to consider the two operations 
(asset substitution and LTR) as distinct ones, and to accept the 2009 balance sheet reporting the 
long term repo as a liability at cost. Only three years later, after the replacement of MPS top 
management, the new general manager Fabrizio Viola found out the “mandate agreement” in a 
safe of the bank’s headquarters; the document included the terms of the transaction between 
MPS and Nomura, certifying the link between the asset substitution and the structured LTR. 
Therefore, the two operations had to be considered as “linked transactions” for a correct 
financial reporting; in particular, as for Santorini, the LTR should have been reported at the fair 
value rather than at cost. This error yielded to the restatement of the equity value as at 
31/12/2011 of -284,1 million euros. 
Last, Nota Italia is a derivative entered by MPS in 2006. At the time, MPS purchased from JP 
Morgan bonds denominated “Floating Rate Notes with Collateral Substitution Right due 2037” 
for a face value of $639 mln. It was established that, in case of default of Italy, the original 
collateral of the notes may be substituted with securities issued by the Italian government itself, 





a credit default swap on Italy, gambling on the country’s stability. From an accounting point of 
view, the notes Nota Italia were split between a bond component and a derivative component. 
The derivative component was reported at its fair value, measured by taking into consideration 
the probability of occurrence of the two risks that it incorporated: the risk of Italy’s default and 
the risk of default of the original collateral. In details, the probability of default of Italy was 
considered as subordinated to the non-default of the first collateral. After a deeper analysis, this 
accounting policy was reviewed in 2012, by considering the two risks cumulatively. The change 
in accounting policy, in accordance with IAS 8, led to the restatement of the equity value as at 
31/12/2011 of -184,3 million euros. 
All in all, the derivatives, determined a negative effect on MPS’ capital of about €800 mln in 
2012, calculated as the sum of the restatements. 
Moreover, the instruments generated most of the liquidity problems that characterized the bank 
along the years. In fact, the long term repos exposed MPS to the “margination” duty towards 
its counterparties (Deutsche Bank and Nomura), calculated as the positive difference between 
the repo value and the mark to market value of the BTPs underlying the repos19 . During 2011, 
the crisis of the Italian sovereign debt dramatically reduced the value of the BTPs, pushing MPS 
to higher and higher margination payments that affected its liquidity position. In the second 
half of 2011, the Bank of Italy was forced to several lending operations for a total of €6 billion 
in order to resolve MPS’ illiquidity problem20. 
Finally, not only MPS had increased its exposition to the BTPs, but it had also cancelled the 
only positive aspect of owning Italian treasuries in the period of the Italian sovereign debt crisis: 
the coupon receiving. Through the swaps on the BTPs, MPS basically nullified the value of the 
coupons21 indeed. 
It can be understood that, leaving aside Nota Italia, the restructuring of the derivatives, 
performed to safeguard the MPS foundation, turned out to be a disaster for the Italian bank. 
The years following Antonveneta: between recapitalizations and State aids 
On the verge of a new era due to the Antonveneta acquisition (or at least this is what was 
                                                      
19 Banca d’Italia, Consob, and IVASS. 2013. “Trattamento Contabile Di Operazioni Di ‘Repo Strutturati a 
Lungo Termine.’” 
20 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Sistema Bancario e Finanziario - Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di 
Siena. 
21 Soldavini, Pierangelo. 2013. “Mps per Tutti. Tutto Quello Che Avreste Voluto Sapere Sul Caso (Ma Non 





expected), MPS realized a net income of €922 million in 200822, also thanks to the restructuring 
of Santorini derivative. Even if decreasing by 35,7% from the result of the previous period, the 
profit allowed the bank to distribute a dividend of €0,013 per share. The MPS foundation 
received €64 mln in aggregate, used for the usual distributions across the Siena’s territory and 
for the beginning of the debt repayment. 
Apart from the diminishing net income, which may be due to the adverse macroeconomic 
conditions23, the main negative point emerging from the financial statements was represented 
by the value of the regulatory capital ratios. In fact, even if the total capital ratio of 9,32% was 
well above the limit value (8%) requested by the newly implemented Basel II regulation, the 
fall in value of the Tier 1 capital ratio (from 6,10% to 5,13%), probably due to the costly 
Antonveneta acquisition, triggered an alarm button. In order to improve the quality of its capital, 
the bank demanded for €1,9 bn of the so-called “Tremonti bonds”. These were bonds issued by 
healthy banks and submitted by the Italian government in 2009; their aim was to support the 
lending to companies and families, by reinforcing the banks’ regulatory capital “Core Tier 1” 
(or Common Equity Tier 1 – CET1). Technically, the bonds presented the following 
attributes24: 
- Subordinated, because in case of insolvency of the bank they were remunerated only 
after the other types of debt. 
- Hybrid, since they presented characteristics of both shares and bonds. In particular, there 
was a face value to be paid back (like bonds), while yearly interest had to be paid only 
conditional on a positive net income (similar to shares’ dividends). 
- Convertible, at the bank’s request, into ordinary shares. 
- Perpetual, because they had no expressed maturity and could be paid back at any 
moment. 
One year later, the Tremonti bonds proved to be affective, allowing MPS to close the 2009 
fiscal year with an improved Tier 1 capital ratio of 7,5%. However, quite surprisingly, the net 
income was still decreasing, making someone doubt about the actual value of the Antonveneta 
operation; the reported net income was just 220 million euros, a value that would have been 
even negative without the restructuring of Alexandria. The positive outcome allowed to pay 
dividends of €0,01 only to the preferred stocks (entirely held by the foundation), such that the 
MPS foundation received 184.000 euros (from the dividends) plus 7 million euros (from the 
                                                      
22 The main figures of MPS’ financial statements are reported in the exhibits (years 2008-2017). 
23 Financial crisis 2018. 





FRESH bonds) to be entirely used, again, for both distributions and debt repayments25. 
In July 2010, MPS passed the stress tests performed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
on the capital adequacy of the major European banks. As a confirmation to the outcome of 
stress test, the balance sheet for the year 2010 illustrated an increase in both the Tier 1 and the 
total capital ratios (from 7,5% to 8,4% and from 11,9% to 12,9% respectively). The result was 
extremely positive also in terms of financial performance: the registered net income was 985,5 
million euros, showing a significant increase (348%) with respect to 2009. But it was just the 
quiet before the storm. 
The 2011 started with a €2,2 billion recapitalization, entirely subscribed by the MPS foundation 
not to lose control of the bank; part of the amount needed for the subscription was raised, again, 
through debt by the Siena’s aid institution. The capital increase was part of the regulatory 
capital improvement program, formally encouraged26 by the president of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi and in line with the Basel III accords, implemented in the European 
Union (EU) on a step-by-step basis starting from 2011. Also, it was aimed at the reimbursement, 
in the future, of the Tremonti bonds. Yet, this would not happen; instead, the capital was used 
for maintaining the bank’s functioning during and after the year that may be seen as the worst 
one along MPS’ history. In fact, the recognition of the Antonveneta operation’s flaws, in the 
form of goodwill impairment for €4,52 billion determined huge losses for the bank in 2011 (-
4,69 billions of euro).  
Considering the whole 2011, the only positive point was represented by the passage of the stress 
tests during the summer, and the increase of the regulatory ratios from the previous year. 
However, the crisis of the Italian sovereign debt determined a downside in terms of capital 
adequacy. According to an exercise performed by the EBA on the capital exposure of the EU 
banks to the sovereign debt (Septmber 2011), MPS presented a capital shortfall of €3,3 bn, to 
be restored by June 2012 in order to reach a CET1 ratio of 9%. 
Despite of the EBA’s requests, Monte de’ Paschi preferred not go on the market to recapitalize, 
since it was considered too risky in a period of adverse structural conditions. Instead, additional 
capital was raised through the disposal of non-core assets (above all, the sale of BiverBanca) 
and the conversion of the FRESH bonds into shares. However, in June 2012, the capital shortfall 
was still estimated at a value of €1,3 bn. On the occasion of the presentation of the industrial 
plan 2012-2015 in June, MPS informed the Bank of Italy that it would not be able to meet the 
                                                      
25 “In Merito Alla Fondazione Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena e Alla Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena. I Rapporti 
Con La Regione Toscana.” 





capital requirements. Therefore, it asked for state aids in the amount of €3,4 billion, 1,9 of 
which to substitute the previous Tremonti bonds and 1,5 to cover the estimated capital shortfall. 
The measure was accepted by the European Commission in December, conditional on the 
presentation of a restructuring plan by MPS. Finally, €4,071 bn of Monti bonds were issued by 
MPS and subscribed by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance on 28/02/2013. The 
additional €671 mln were due to the derivatives scandal27 and its expected impact on the bank’s 
capital, as well as the anticipated payment of the interests on the Tremonti bonds.  
A couple of months after the issue of the bonds, in April 2013, the balance sheet for the period 
2012 was approved by the shareholders and made public. It reported, again, a heavy loss of 
€3,17 billion. As for 2011, part of the negative result was due to the impairment on goodwill 
for €1,53 bn. The remaining half, instead, was caused by the provisions on credits; the portfolio 
of non-performing exposures28 had increased to €29,5 bn (+28%) during 2012, inducing the 
bank to report provisions for €2,67 bn. At the time, the non-performing exposures represented  
19,1% of the total credits. Indeed, this value would raise even more in the following years, and 
the NPLs would be the reason of several problems for MPS (and the whole Italian banking 
system). 
In October 2013, as conditional to the Monti bonds issue, the restructuring plan 2013-2017 was 
presented. Besides the strategic goals aimed at the reduction of costs, the plan envisaged29 the 
reduction of the Italian BTPs portfolio, a €2,5 bn recapitalization by the end of 2014 and the 
repayment of €3 bn of Monti bonds in 2014. 
The fiscal year 2013 was closed with a net reported loss of €1,44 bn. Again, the provisions on 
credits had a very negative impact of 2,82 billions of euro; also, the NPLs portfolio had raised 
to 36 billions of euro. The NPLs accounted now for 24,5% of the total credits. 
During June 2014 a recapitalization of €5 billions was performed and €3 billions of Monti 
bonds were paid back, as established by the restructuring plan. Thanks to the delay in the timing 
of the recapitalization requested by the MPS foundation, the major shareholder was able to take 
part to the capital raising for its share, dropped to 2,5%. In fact, the MPS foundation had carried 
out a series of disposals of the MPS’ stocks starting from December 2013, when it still 
accounted for 33,5% of the bank’s capital; the measure had been taken in order to restore the 
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financial stability, by extinguishing the previously-originated debts. The sales operated by the 
foundation represented the end of the Siena system as it had been known until then: the politics’ 
chains tying MPS had been finally (but temporarily) broken. 
Despite of the recapitalization, MPS failed the EU-wide stress tests 2014. These outlined a 
capital shortfall of about 2 billion euros, to be restored in the least possible time. 
The stringent standards adopted by the EBA also had an impact on the 2014 balance sheet: MPS 
reported higher NPLs (€45,3 billion) and provisions (€7,82 bn), mainly due to a change in the 
policy for the classification and the valuation of the NPLs’ portfolio, that raised to 31,7% of the 
total credits; this revision had been determined, in turn, by the Asset Quality Review developed 
by the EBA together with the stress tests. The elevated value of the provisions was, again, the 
main responsible the huge losses reported by the Italian bank (€5,34 bn). 
In relation to the capital shortfall evidenced by the stress tests 2014, MPS performed a new 
recapitalization between May and June 2015. Through the operation, the Italian bank raised 
additional capital for 3 billions of euro that were used, in part, to pay back the remaining Monti 
bonds. Instead, the Monti bonds’ interests were paid back through the emission of stocks; 
through this transaction, the Italian Government stepped into the bank’s equity with a share of 
4%. 
All in all, 2015 seemed to be a year of recovery for MPS that, after 4 year of losses, reported a 
positive net income of 388 millions euro. Also, thanks to the recapitalization, the regulatory 
ratios (Total Capital ratio of 16% and CET1 of 12%) were in line with the Basel III 
requirements. 
The last failure to the stress tests and the bail-out 
Despite of the recovering net income, the NPEs had kept growing during 2015, registering the 
highest NPLs-to-credits ratio in Italy of 34,8% (total NPLs portfolio of €46,9 bn). This would 
ultimately affect the bank in 2016. In fact the ECB warned the Italian bank to reduce its portfolio 
of NPEs by 2018. MPS presented a restructuring plan to solve the issue before the stress tests 
2016. The plan, approved by the ECB on the same day of the publication of stress tests’ results, 
envisaged the disposal of the whole portfolio of €27,7 bn Bad Debts30 (book value of €10,5 bn 
at June 2016); this would be supported31 by a new recapitalization of 5 billions euro, 
accountable in part for the provisions on the remaining NPEs and, for the other part, for the loss 
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due to the disposal of the NPLs at a price below their book value. 
For what regards the stress tests, as anticipated, the outcome was extremely poor for the Italian 
bank: among 51 European institutes, MPS was the only bank failing the screening in the adverse 
scenario (CET1 of -2,23%). 
On 25/11/2016 the shareholders formally approved the €5 billion recapitalization, to be carried 
out after the Italian constitutional referendum for the amendment of the Italian Constitution. 
The recapitalization would be made of two legs: first, the conversion into shares of the 
subordinated bonds and second32, the actual capital raising based on an anchor investor 
(identified in the Qatar fund QIA). Among the political uncertainties due to the negative result 
of the referendum, the whole operation started out on the 19th of December. Few days after the 
recapitalization was declared failed due to the lack of an anchor investor, since the Qatar fund 
had stepped away after the warning results of the Italian referendum. Consequently, MPS’ 
stocks were suspended from trading on the Italian stock exchange. 
Considering these happenings, the Italian Government issued a Decree-law33 that would lead 
to the bail-out of Monte dei Paschi di Siena. The rescue would occur under the “precautionary 
recapitalization” umbrella, as allowed by the European Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) in the cases of crises of solvent institutions with systemic relevance. 
However, the procedure was still subject to the approval of the ECB that, considered the overall 
situation, had requested for an even higher capital restoring of €8,8 billion. 
In June, after a long negotiation, the European Authorities approved the precautionary 
recapitalization of MPS, but conditional on very strict policies: application of the burden 
sharing principle, dismissal of the whole portfolio of bad debts, and the definition of a ceiling 
to the management’s salaries. The main point was represented, again, by the NPLs’ disposal. 
Indeed, they were the real problem of the Italian bank: the balance sheet 2016 had reported 
provisions for €4,5 bn, which in turn were responsible for a net loss of €3,38 billion. Therefore, 
it is comprehensible that the Authorities wanted to make sure to reduce the huge impact of the 
non-performing exposures on Monte dei Paschi’s financial stability. As such, the bank revised 
the deal previously formulated with the fund Atlante II for the disposal of the portfolio of €9,4 
billions of net bad debts (gross amount of €28,6 bn) at the total price of 5,5 billions of euro. In 
particular, the sale would occur through the securitization of the NPLs: the resulting mezzanine 
and junior tranches would be purchased by Atlante II for about €1,5 bn, and the senior tranche 
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of €3,3 bn would be sold to private investors, under the GACS umbrella. The difference 
between the securitization price and the book value (around €4 bn) was reported in the half-
yearly income statement as a provision, in order to adjust the book value of the bad debts to 
their expected sale price34. 
Thanks to the disposal plan, the precautionary recapitalization was ultimately approved by the 
European Authorities, even reducing the needed amount to €8,3 billion. Finally, the 
recapitalization was performed35 by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF), that 
submitted new shares of MPS for a total value of 3,85 billions of euro. Simultaneously, the 
activation of the burden sharing forced the conversion of the subordinated bonds into ordinary 
stocks, for an amount of €4,47 bn. Due to the procedure, the Italian Government was now the 
main shareholder of MPS, holding 53,5% of its equity. However, the amount was expected to 
raise, because of the reimbursement, to be operated by the State, of the small investors who had 
seen their bonds converted into shares because of the burden sharing process. The 
reimbursement terminated in November 2017 when, at the end of an exchange offer, the Italian 
Government paid back the small investors for a total amount of €1,53 bn; the MEF raised to 
68% of the capital of MPS. All in all, the Italian tax payers invested 5,4 billions of euro for the 
bail-out of Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 
Recently, the securitization of the NPLs has started36, through the subscription of the mezzanine 
tranche by Quaestio SGR, the company managing the Atlante II fund. The process is still 
ongoing, and it will be ultimately completed through the sale of the senior and junior tranches. 
Will it be the start of new future for the oldest bank in the world, or it will be just another Italian 
disillusion? 
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1. What are the major drivers of the crisis of Monte dei Paschi? What is the role played 
by the MPS foundation? 
The whole story of the crisis of Monte Paschi di Siena may be split into two main periods that, 
in turn, are linked to the two drivers that impacted on the bank’s operations and financial 
stability. First, there is the inorganic growth, whose main step was the Antonveneta acquisition, 
that led, directly or indirectly, to both report huge losses and present capital shortfalls between 
2009 and 2014. Second, the non-performing exposures represented the Achille’s heel that has 
affected Monte Paschi di Siena since 2013/2014. As it emerges from the text, the two aspects 
would be, in some cases, overlapping and interrelated; the sharp distinction is indeed proposed 
just at theoretical level, in order to frame the happenings for an easier understanding. Moreover, 
it shall be remarked that, while the first driver only represented a serious pitfall for MPS, the 
NPLs are a phenomenon that still hurts the whole Italian banking system, even if MPS has 
proved to be one of the most troubled institutes in relation to it. 
Within these variables, the MPS foundation played a key role and it may be considered , as well 
as the Siena system that it represented, the major responsible for the crisis of MPS. While this 
connection may appear as quite straightforward in relation to the inorganic growth, it probably 
would not be the case for the non-performing loans. Therefore, together with the clarification 
of these concepts, some economics findings will be illustrated to draw on. 
Laeven and Levin (2008) showed that, within the field of banks’ governance, the existence of 
a large owner is often associated with higher “risk taking” for a bank; this happens because 
large owners have greater power than smaller ones to increase the bank’s incentives to take on 
risk (John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008). If we consider that the paper defines “large power” 
shareholders as the ones with at least 20% voting rights, the connection with the MPS case, 
where the foundations held 58% of the rights (including the preferred stocks) until 2012, seems 
obvious. In the case of MPS, it shall also be reminded that, through the foundation, the board 
of directors was not only subject to the strength exercised by a powerful shareholder, but also 
to the Siena’s political and social influence that was pushing towards a large acquisition. 
Indeed, in the case of Monte dei Paschi, the higher risk was definitely embodied by the 
acquisition of Antonveneta itself, that may be regarded as the original cause that led to a series 
of unfavourable events. In fact, the pricy acquisition determined the need for the Tremonti 
bonds and the reported impairment on goodwill in 2011 and 2012 (as well as the respective 





restructure Santorini and Alexandria, rather than closing out the positions as a sound 
management practice would have required. The restructuring pushed the bank into the liquidity 
crisis in 2011 and to be called for a recap by the ECB; this was substituted by the emission of 
the Monti bonds and, in order to pay back the governmental aids, a recapitalization of €5 billion 
was carried out in 2014, when the MPS foundation had just reached the 2,5% of the bank’s 
capital. This may be seen as the point that ultimately completed the vicious circle started in 
2008 with the acquisition of Antonveneta; eventually, the series of controversial happenings 
had led the foundation to be almost excluded from the bank’s equity. 
Despite of the of the 2014 recap, MPS’ troubles were not over yet. MPS had the largest NPL to 
credits ratio among the Italian banks; the NPLs crisis was just about to start, leading the Italian 
bank to the several troubles observed in the case and to be finally bailed-out by the Italian 
government. As already mentioned, identifying responsibilities for the MPS foundation, and in 
general for the Siena system, in relation to this “second driver” might be tricky. However, as 
recently demonstrated, the presence of politically connected directors within the banks’ board 
might alter the issue of credit; the likely reason is that, because of the political connections, 
loans would be granted in order to pursue personal and party’s political goals. In particular, 
Morpurgo, Brogi, Caselli and D’Amico showed that, especially for local banks, boards 
composed by a higher proportion of politically connected directors are linked to a larger share 
of NPLs for a bank. This finding is extremely suitable for explaining the MPS case indeed. In 
fact, the board of directors of MPS presented a majority of directors appointed by the MPS 
foundation, since it was the main shareholder of the bank. The representatives of the foundation, 
in turn, were nominated by the political party governing the Municipality and the Province of 
Siena. Given these relationships, it seems clear the political influence that characterised not 
only the MPS foundation, but also Monte dei Paschi di Siena. Therefore, considering the 
Morpurgo et. al paper, it is fair to state that also the extremely large share of NPLs has been 
determined, again, by the complex mechanisms of interests and relationships that was realized 
through the participation of the foundation in the bank’s capital. 
In relation to this point, one might argue that, while the foundation had retained control until 
2013, the NPLs seriously affected Monte de’ Paschi’s financial stability starting from 2014. As 
an answer to this criticism, it shall be borne in mind that the non-performing exposures only 
represent an accounting classification for already existing credits; indeed, these credits had been 





2. Considering your answer to the previous question, what could have been the 
mechanisms to prevent the municipalities’ intervention, and therefore the political 
influence, within the MPS’ governance? 
Considering the two drivers, and their respective roots, that ultimately determined the crisis of 
MPS, two main lines of intervention could have been implemented in order to improve the 
bank’s governance. In fact, in accordance with the economics theories illustrated so far, the 
depletion of the power of the main shareholder and the reduction of political connections within 
the bank’s board may had led to a decrease in risk-taking strategies and a better allocation of 
credit respectively. These two measures may have been realized through several strategies. 
For what regards the reduction of the power of the main shareholder, the first possibility would 
have been to simply force the foundation to sell part of its shares. This is what happened with 
Ciampi law in 1998 indeed. However, such a policy might be perceived as too strict and even 
unfair, because it would deprive the foundation of its main assets, draining resources from the 
whole local community of Siena, that firmly relied on the bank’s incomes and dividends 
distribution. This is probably what induced the foundation to convert ordinary stocks into 
preferred ones, in order to comply with the Ciampi law while keeping on exerting the most 
possible control on the bank, still owning 58% of its capital (48% ordinary shares + 10% 
preferred ones). Leveraging onto this decision, a second strategy comes to mind; it is exactly 
the conversion of ordinary shares into preferred ones. Since this type of instrument eliminates 
the voting rights associated with the ordinary shares, it would be perfect for reducing the 
foundation’s power at the shareholders’ meetings of MPS. This would happen without harming 
the interest of the foundation in receiving yearly premiums from the bank; indeed, the 
conversion would even reinforce this right, because of the higher dividends yielded by the 
preferred stocks. 
Finally, a third mechanism that could have been implemented is represented by the direct 
imposition of a limit to the major shareholder’s votes. In fact, by establishing a cap level to the 
exercisable voting rights, the MPS foundation would have had less authority to increase the 
incentives of the bank to take on risk. 
Considering the policies described so far, one major flaw of both the second and third option 
would have been the increase in power of the minority shareholders; they would have been 
entitled with as many rights as a major shareholder, and this might have ultimately resulted in 
the “excessive risk taking” described by Laeven and Levin. Therefore, the best alternative 





envisaged by the Ciampi law would have been needed, obliging the MPS foundation to sell 
shares for an amount such that it would reach less than 20% of the bank’s capital (in line with 
the Laeven and Levin theory); also, shares should have been purchased within a certain limit 
(i.e. 3-4%) by the investors, in order to avoid the appearance of a new large shareholder. In 
order to ensure transparency and the full accomplishment of the goals, the whole process may 
have been directed by an external party, such as the Bank of Italy or the ABI (Italian Banking 
Association). 
A second point to consider should have been the political connection within the MPS’ board; 
by limiting this feature, the credit allocation probably would have improved. In order to 
eliminate, or at least to reduce the political influence expressed through the MPS foundation, 
two general approaches could have been adopted; either directly working on the MPS board, or 
dealing with the top of the pyramid, the MPS foundation. In particular, for the first option, in 
addition to the policies described so far (preferred shares and so on), another possibility might 
have been to establish the ineligibility for individuals who had been, along their life, inscribed 
to political parties, either just in the region of Tuscany or in the whole Italian territory. Also, it 
could have been envisaged a ratification mechanism for the MPS board, entitling the Bank of 
Italy to approve its election and, in some extreme cases, to ban some of its members. 
Secondly, another way might have been to rethink the organization of the whole MPS 
foundation. In fact, by looking at the composition of the Deputation, it is easy to understand 
how the Siena’s politics parties played a key role in appointing the foundation’s members and 
guiding its actions. By making some members of the administrative body eligible by non-local 
entities, for example the Bank of Italy or Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF), the 
political influence would have been reduced. Also, forbidding the transfer from the Deputation 
of the foundation to the MPS board (as happened with the president Mussari in 2006) might 
have been a good measure. 
Finally, higher accountability and more transparency should have been imposed to the MPS 
foundation. In fact, as outlined by Jassaud N., foundations were subject to low internal 
accountability and external supervision, resulting in weak corporate governance practices and 
very poor clarity regarding the appointment of their governing bodies; also, foundations were 
not required to comply with uniform accounting and disclosure practices. With regards to the 
MPS foundation, it seems extremely odd that the major shareholder of the third Italian largest 
bank could have been subject to such restricted compliance; indeed, it is a paradox that the 
“owner” of a bank, probably the most controlled institute in the world, has to comply, instead, 





generates an impact on the political influence within MPS, Jassaud suggested to establish a 
third party ratification for the foundation’s financial statements; also, in order to develop a more 
transparent corporate governance, term-limits should have been introduced for the Deputation 
members and it should have envisaged a period of grace between political office roles and the 
eligibility for the foundation bodies, as it happens for the boards of directors of the banks. 
3. What are the main characteristics of the Antonveneta acquisition, and how did they 
impact on MPS financial results? 
What are the determinants associated with M&A cash financing, and how do they fit 
the acquisition of Antonveneta? 
Which are the main pitfalls of not executing a due diligence? How do they show up in 
MPS case? 
MPS acquired Antonveneta from Banco Santander, at the final price of €10,3 billion, 6 of which 
reported as goodwill. While the deal was announced in 2007, the whole process started out 
almost one year later, when MPS submitted a specific financing plan to the Bank of Italy. 
As it emerges from the case, the initial decision through which the price (€9,3 bn at the 
beginning) was settled was rather hurried, given the ultimatum of the president of the selling-
side. 
Despite of the financing plan, MPS reported a decreasing tier 1 ratio in the 2008 financial 
statements; this led the bank to ask for the governmental aids known as “Tremonti bonds”. 
Later on, the impairments on goodwill determined deep losses for the bank in 2011 and 2012. 
One of the main characteristics of the operation was the funding technique adopted; the 
acquisition was totally cash-financed, and the payment was performed through the emission of 
8 cheques to Banco Santander. In order to understand the main reasons for M&A cash financing 
and how they match the case of MPS, the findings of Faccio M. and Masulis R. W. (2002) will 
be illustrated. They performed a series of regressions to account for the link between the major 
characteristics of European M&A deals and the financing strategy adopted (cash or stock). All 
in all, the researchers showed that the financing decision is influenced by several factors related 
to the features of the bidder, the target and the deal, as well as country-specific characteristics. 
In particular, the main variables considered, and their respective results, are the following: 
1. Corporate control. The use of cash in M&As increases when the bidder’s controlling 
shareholder has between 40% and 60% voting rights. This happens because, by using cash, 





2. Size of the bidder. Larger bidders appear to be more likely to use cash, probably because of 
the greater facility in issuing debt. 
3. Size of the deal. For relatively high value deals, stock financing seems to be the most 
preferred way. 
4. Asymmetric information. Bidders tend to use stocks when they believe that they are 
overvalued. 
5. “Nationality” of the deal. Cash is preferred for cross-border transactions, while stock 
payments are used for domestic M&As. 
6. “Growth opportunities”. Target companies are likely to request for stock payment when the 
bidder shows an elevated growth over time. 
Also, as shown by Fishman S. J. (1989), cash financing is usually connected with the pre-
emption of competition; by accelerating the timing of the deal execution, cash payments enable 
bidders to prevent offers from competitors. 
When analysing the case of MPS, it seems remarkable how most of the described determinants 
also characterise the acquisition of Antonveneta. Indeed, the major shareholder owned between 
40% and 60% of voting rights (precisely the MPS foundation was at 48%), MPS had a 
significant debt capacity (as it later issued debt for financing the operation), the transaction was 
“international”, and the final offer was done in order to exclude the competition of BNP Paribas. 
In relation to these considerations, one is particularly relevant: the cash was probably preferred 
over stocks in order to avoid the dilution of the MPS foundation that, as it has been described 
so far, represented the major root of each of MPS’ strategies. 
Another peculiarity of the Antonveneta deal was the closing without the completion of a due 
diligence process. The due diligence is an unbiased, objective analysis of the acquisition target; 
it represents a fundamental step of an M&A transaction. It focuses on financial reports, tax 
issues, asset valuation and operations and it gives confidence to the acquirers about the 
transaction’s value and its main risks (Angwin, Duncan 2001). Eventually, due diligence may 
detect issues that could not be identified otherwise, such as manipulated financial statements, 
poor internal communication, pending litigations and tax contingencies. In particular, Adolph 
G., Gillies S. and Krings J. underline the importance of carrying out not only a financial and 
legal due diligence, but also a strategic one. While the first two relate to the analysis of financial 
statements and cash flow projections, as well as tax-related problems and possible ongoing 
legal proceedings, the third means evaluating the degree of fit of the target and the acquirer’s 
capability to fully unlock the potential of the acquired company. Indeed, as the authors suggest, 





buying the company at the right price, strategic due diligence explores whether that potential is 
realistic”. This may be summarised by identifying the two objectives of the whole due diligence 
process: 
1. Determining the actual value of the target, by deeply evaluating its financial statements 
and discovering any hidden liabilities that may affect the business in the future (legal and 
financial due diligence). 
2. Understanding your capabilities to realize that value, by taking into consideration the level 
of fit between the two companies (strategic due diligence). 
In the case of Monte dei Paschi, due to the short time of the operation, as well as the pressures 
imposed by Banco Santander, the bank did not perform any kind of due diligence for the 
acquisition of Banca Antonveneta. This, ultimately resulted in not identifying some serious 
flaws of Antonveneta that, if recognized earlier, may have led to a different decision, or at least 
to lower the bid for the Italian bank. In particular, still referring to the mentioned article, a 
thorough due diligence process would have led to the following: 
- Legal and financial analysis would have discovered the €7,9 bn debt towards Santander and 
the fact that the provisions had to be revised. 
- Strategic due diligence would have assessed that Antonveneta was badly divisionalised, it 
presented a poor internal and external information management and the costs were already 
very low, meaning a potential difficulty at improving the bank’s financial performance. 
 
4. What is bail-in and what is its rationale? Why it was not applied in the case of Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena? 
The bail-in represents the main measure envisaged by the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) for solving the European banks’ crises. The main idea behind the rule is to 
define a tool that stems from saving banks through public interventions (bail-outs), as these 
involve the use of taxpayers’ money. Therefore, the bail-in entered into force in the EU since 
January 2016. Under this norm, if a bank is failing or it is likely to fail, and the normal 
insolvency proceedings would not safeguard the stability of the system, the institution is 
maintained into operation (“resolved”) through the write down of shares and the conversion of 
liabilities into equity, in order to recapitalize the institution and allow for the absorption of the 
losses37. The conversion or the write off are executed following the liabilities’ order of 
                                                      





subordination; only the deposits up to €100.000 and the secured liabilities are excluded from 
this process. So, it seems remarkable that not only the subordinated bonds participate to the 
losses but, if necessary, also the senior obligations (if not secured) are switched to equity or 
written off. 
However, room for flexibility was left by the regulators, that envisaged the possibility of the 
State-operated “precautionary recapitalisation”, in special cases of solvents banks who were 
unable to collect new equity on the markets following a stress test or a comprehensive 
assessment. This particular type of “bail-out” is also conditional on further specifications, 
specifically met by MPS38: 
- The aids are conceded “in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State and preserve financial stability”; this means that the institution has a systemic 
relevance. 
- Precautionary recapitalisations “shall be confined to solvent institutions”. 
- The measure is “conditional on final approval” by the European Authorities. 
- The recapitalization operated by the State must presents “precautionary and temporary 
nature”. 
- The capital injection has to be “proportionate” to the capital need of the bank, meaning that 
it shall not exceed the capital shortage estimated by the supervisor. 
- The measure is adopted under the burden sharing principle, similarly to the bail-in; both the 
shareholders and the subordinated bondholders must participate to the process. As happened 
with MPS, while the first are strongly diluted, the second ones are compulsorily converted 
into equity. 
In relation to this last point, it shall be noticed that, while with the bail-in forces all the liabilities 
(with the already-said exceptions) to conversion, in the case of a precautionary recapitalisation 
only the subordinated bonds are involved. 
Considering the description so far, it may appear that the measure of the “precautionary 
recapitalisation” goes against the rationale of the BRRD itself, being this the epilogue of public 
bail-outs. This point seems in line with the studies of Kahn C. M. and Santos J. A. C. (2005), 
who examined the time-consistency of regulation. In particular, they reflected on the following. 
When a crisis arises, larger institutions are generally bailed-out, because of their systemic 
relevance for the structure of the financial markets. This leads regulators to say “never again”, 
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and to define new regulations that should prevent other bail-outs. However, being the rules 
settled by taking into consideration the previous crisis, they lack time-consistency, since they 
cannot forecast each possible future scenario. Therefore, in the future, there will be other, “new” 
good reasons for saving banks in trouble; the institutions will happen to be bailed-out again, in 
contradiction with the previously-established regulation. Knowing this, banks will ultimately 
engage in moral hazard, even if the above mentioned rules are exactly intended to avoid it, by 
warning the markets that banks will not be publicly rescued anymore. 
In relation to the BRRD, it seems that, understanding the time-consistency problem of 
regulation, the European regulator left himself a room for more tailored measures in the case 
of the manifestation of the above mentioned “good reasons” not to apply the bail-in; this has 
been done through the institution of the precautionary recapitalisation. In particular, in the case 
of MPS, these “good reasons” may be seen as the existence of subordinated bonds held by 
families and small investors who purchased them before the coming into force of the BRRD, 
therefore unaware of the risks related to the bail-in. By becoming a shareholder of Monte dei 
Paschi, the Italian Government was able to reimburse those investors who unfairly saw their 
bonds being converted into shares. 
5. What are the most used strategies for the management of the non-performing 
exposures in Italy? How were they developed over years? How is Monte de' Paschi 
moving forward in this process? 
A proper handling of the non-performing loans mainly comprises two possibilities: either 
keeping the exposures on-balance sheet or the sale to third entities. While the first option forces 
the banks to stock provisions, which in turn affect P&L account, and periodically write-off the 
NPLs, the second alternative might lead to report a loss all at once, when the sale price is 
significantly lower than the book value of the loans. As Jassaud N. and Kang K. pointed out, 
the level of provisions of Italian banks did not keep the pace with the increase in the NPLs that, 
between 2008 and 2014 have grown at the yearly rate 20%, ultimately reaching the peak of 
€341 billion at the end of 2014 (gross amount), mostly due to the prolonged recession that 
worsened borrowers’ ability to pay back their obligations; the relatively low level of provisions, 
as well as the lengthy judicial process that raises the cost of foreclosure for banks, determined 
very poor incentives to either write offs the NPEs or to proceed to their disposal. Considering 
the circumstances, the authors aimed at the creation of a more efficient market for the resolution 





From that moment on, a lot has been done. In particular, measures were adopted in the 
directions of incentivizing the provisioning and the write-off of the NPEs, as well as facilitating 
their disposal. In relation to the first, the ECB’s “Guidance to Banks on Non-Performing Loans” 
pressured the banks to revise their NPL strategies, requiring more structured disclosure; also, 
the publication of an “Addendum” to the guidance has settled even more stringent prudential 
provisioning rules. 
Secondly, several initiatives have contributed to the develop more efficient practices and 
markets for the sale of the non-performing loans. In this sense, the best strategy identified was 
the one of the securitisation. Banks sell their NPLs to a special purpose vehicle, that funds the 
purchase through the emission of asset-backed securities, whose collateral is represented by the 
NPLs; the emission takes place in several tranches (senior, mezzanine and junior) with different 
levels of subordination, that are paid back through the recollection of the bad loans. Ad-hoc 
funds Atlante and Atlante II, sponsored by the Government and financed by banks and other 
institutions, were constituted for the acquisition of mezzanine and junior tranches. Finally, the 
State-backed guarantee GACS (“Garanzia cartolarizzazione sofferenze”) for the equity 
tranches was envisaged by the Italian Government. 
The mentioned policies determined an improvement of the overall Italian situation, considering 
the NPLs had been constantly decreasing, reaching the value of 300 euro billion in June 2017 
(gross amount). By looking at the recent developments, PwC forecasts 2018 to be “the year of 
NPE transformation and breakthrough”.  
Within this frame, MPS happens to play a key role. Indeed, while the NPEs of the bank have 
negatively affected the Italian scenario during the last years (as reported in the case, it was the 
worst bank in Italy for NPLs-to-credits ratio), MPS will now be the leader of the transformation 
predicted by PwC. In fact, after the failure of the first deal with Atlante II because of the 
unsuccessful recapitalization in 2016, MPS, under the new governmental management, has just 
started the disposal of €28,6 billion of bad loans, through the combination of the Atlante II 
investments and the GACS guarantee. Indeed, on 10/01/2018 Atlante II acquired the mezzanine 
tranche for €805 mln. The junior and the senior tranche will follow, purchased by Atlante II 
and private investors (under the GACS) respectively.
 
   
EXHIBITS 
Exhibit 1 – Net income and non-performing loans figures after Antonveneta acquisition (in millions). 
 
   
Exhibit 2 – Net income trend, years 2008-2017.
 
Exhibit 3 – MPS’ total credits and the relative share of the non-performing loans during yeas 
2008-2017. 
 
   
Exhibit 4 – Non-performing loans to credits ratio, years 2008-2017 
 




   
Exhibit 6 – Losses on write-offs/cumulative provisions ratio for years 2008-2017. “Cumulative 
provisions” stand for the balance sheet account of accumulated provisions.  
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